

**DNS New World Order:**

**QuadX! DoH! DoT!**

**Da Fuq?**

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**@troutman**

# Who is this guy and why is he cranky?

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- ❖ Internet "Old Timer" & Engineer, online via a "paper TTY" with a 300 bps acoustic coupler modem in 1982, user of the Internet & UNIX since 1987. Tasked with building and running Internet infrastructure off and on since the early 90s. Have held a wide variety of roles in Internet operations, engineering, and management at various regional ISPs, CLECs, ILECs, cable TV companies, web hosts, and in IT. Independent Consultant for hire.

# Disclaimer

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# NNENIX

**NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND  
NEUTRAL INTERNET EXCHANGE**

- ❖ I am also a Director & Co-Founder of the non-for-profit Northern New England Neutral Internet Exchange ([NNENIX.NET](http://NNENIX.NET))
- ❖ Disclaimer: NNENIX hosts servers for Quad9

# Topics of Presentation

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- ❖ Domain Name System (DNS) in general & new encrypted DNS methods like DNS over HTTPS (DoH), DNS over TLS (DoT).
- ❖ Operational reasons why you should monitor DNS
- ❖ Cloud services offering easy to remember DNS servers & why they would want to give such a gift to the world
- ❖ Privacy implications of Web Browser product decisions
- ❖ Recommendations to mitigate the impact of new DNS encryption methods

## New Troubleshooting Procedure

- 1.) "It's not DNS."
- 2.) "There's no way it's DNS."
- 3.) "It was DNS."

# Domain Name System (DNS)

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- ❖ One of the most important foundational technologies that makes the Internet work
- ❖ It works so well that you almost never think about
- ❖ Most end-users have no knowledge of it
- ❖ DNS “simply” converts names that humans can remember into numbers (network addresses)

# Domain Name System (DNS)

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- ❖ Also used internally by most organizations
- ❖ Microsoft Active Directory depends entirely on DNS working correctly and reliably

# Domain Name System (DNS)

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- ❖ Nearly 100% of everything you do on the Internet needs DNS to function.
- ❖ This is why when people say things like “the Internet is down” the Internet is usually just fine, but your DNS server is not working.
- ❖ DNS requests are usually called “queries”



# Domain Name System (DNS)

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
- ❖ Your DNS query history can reveal a lot about you and what you are doing online.
- ❖ Every every website you visit, your email client, the games you play, and most apps your run depend on DNS to work.

# Domain Name System (DNS)

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- ❖ Domain Names are hierarchical
- ❖ Starts at the root, or “.”, then top level domains (TLDs) then second or more levels
- ❖ Generic TLDs (gTLDs) like .com, .gov, .net, or country code TLD (ccTLDs) like .us, .uk, .jp
- ❖ Use to be just a handful, now more than 1000 TLDs in existence (.bank, .coop, .horse)

# Domain Name System (DNS)



# Domain Name System (DNS)

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❖ Examples:

❖ google.com

❖ www.bbc.co.uk

❖ ixp.nnenix.net

❖ example.co.jp

# Domain Name System (DNS)

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- ❖ DNS is a network service that converts names in a hierarchical structure into IP protocol addresses that IP network use.
- ❖ www.cnn.com “A record”
  - ❖ IPv4 151.101.1.67
- ❖ www.cnn.com “AAAA record”
  - ❖ IPv6 2a04:4e42:200::323

# Domain Name System (DNS)

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- ❖ Initially created in RFC882 in 1983, superseded by RFC1035 in 1987
- ❖ BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain) created in 1985
- ❖ DNS is the last major plain text protocol on the Internet.

# Root DNS Servers

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- ❖ 13 Root servers (A through M), operated by 12 different organizations ([root-servers.org](http://root-servers.org))
- ❖ Not 13 individual servers! Clusters of servers, with load balancers, and many Anycast instances
- ❖ Some root servers have ~160 separate physical instances around the world
- ❖ Allows scaling of traffic volumes, increase resiliency and redundancy, especially against directed attacks

# Root DNS Servers

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- ❖ Each root server gets double-digit billions of DNS queries per day
- ❖ Trillions of DNS queries answered per month
- ❖ DNS has scaled over 9 orders of magnitude over 35 years, and will continue to so



# IP Anycasting

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- ❖ Anycast is a technique where a unique IP address block is advertised in multiple physical locations, to different sections of the Internet, at the same time via BGP routing.
- ❖ Routing decisions “steer” traffic to the “best” nearest instance of that IP address via BGP decision making.
- ❖ Use for massively distributed services like the DNS root servers & DNS Cloud Providers

# Traditional DNS (Do53)

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- ❖ RFC882/RFC1034 and others
- ❖ Plain text protocol
- ❖ UDP Port 53 for queries, TCP Port for 53 for Zone file transfer to secondaries
- ❖ Some call it Do53 now
- ❖ Largely the same since 1985: ~35 years!

# Traditional DNS (Do53)

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- ❖ Because of plaintext, can be monitored over the wire easily
- ❖ Incredibly useful for knowing what your endpoints are up to, and finding malware traffic and AUP violations on your network.
- ❖ If your IT security staff isn't monitoring DNS, they should be!

# DNSSEC

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- ❖ Domain Name System Security Extensions - work started in 1999
- ❖ extensions to DNS which provide cryptographic authentication of DNS data and integrity
- ❖ does nothing for confidentiality
- ❖ Not the topic of this presentation

# DNSCrypt

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- ❖ 2011 - no RFC process, not done through IETF
- ❖ DNS over TCP/UDP Port 443, but not TLS
- ❖ Solved a lot of problems, but didn't get much traction at the time

# DNS over TLS (DoT)

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- ❖ RFC7858 May 2016, updated by RFC8310 March 2018
- ❖ Uses TCP Port 853 with TLS encryption
- ❖ Keeps network control traffic separate from application data traffic

# DNS over TLS (DoT)

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- ❖ Supported by Android 9+ for the whole OS, just works if supported by server.
- ❖ Microsoft now has support for DoT in latest Windows 10 preview releases

# DNS over HTTPS (DoH)

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- ❖ RFC8484 December 2018
- ❖ Uses TCP Port 443 with TLS encryption
- ❖ DNS queries over a special HTTP GET with JSON responses
- ❖ Can be several milliseconds slower than Do53



# DNS in the Cloud (DoC)

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- ❖ For many years there have been “public” resolver DNS servers, operated mostly by ISPs as a public resource.
  - ❖ 4.2.2.2
  - ❖ 75.75.75.75
  - ❖ lots of others

# DNS in the Cloud (DoC)

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- ❖ Google launched their service of 8.8.8.8 in December 2009
  - ❖ To improve speeds and user experience verses old broken ISP DNS
  - ❖ Also useful to work-around censorship issues at the time



DNS: 8.8.8.8 kuşun ötsün!  
Alternatif: 8.8.4.4

@KADIKOYBASKA

# DNS in the Cloud (DoC)

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- ❖ Now there are several others
- ❖ Cloudflare 1.1.1.1
- ❖ Quad9 9.9.9.9

# DNS in the Cloud (DoC)

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- ❖ OpenDNS (Cisco Umbrella)  
208.67.222.222
- ❖ CIRA Canadian Shield 149.112.121.10

A meme featuring a smiling man in a Star Trek uniform. The text is overlaid in large, bold, white letters with a black outline. The background is a blurred image of the man's face and uniform.

**HE WHO CONTROLS DNS**

**CONTROLS  
EVERYTHING**

# **DNS is great for tracking**

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- ❖ If you can monitor DNS queries, you can know everywhere someone goes online
- ❖ Shopping, entertainment, work, medical sites, apps, etc.
- ❖ Even what devices you may have in your house or business

# **DNS comes with great power**

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- ❖ If you control DNS, you can control where users go or don't go.
- ❖ Of course, DNS monitoring is great for fighting malware and intrusions
- ❖ Essential for blue team network defense & monitoring




# **DNS = \$\$\$ for ISPs**

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- ❖ Many (most?) large ISPs, CATV, ILECs, are selling their customer's DNS information to a variety of data brokers, advertising and tracking companies. Or own one themselves
- ❖ And they can tie that data directly to YOU at your house or your to cellular phone account

**IF YOU'RE NOT PAYING FOR A PRODUCT**



**YOU ARE THE PRODUCT**

imgflip.com

# Web Browsers Pushing DoH

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- ❖ Firefox 62, released in September 2018 added support for DoH through flags
- ❖ Firefox 72 (January 9th, 2020) has DoH as option in Network Settings
- ❖ Now enabled by default for all Firefox users in the USA.

# Web Browsers Pushing DoH

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- ❖ Mozilla picked CloudFlare as first and default DoH provider. Requirements to honor and a contract
- ❖ Domain Name canary to disable if you control your DNS (so ISPs can disable DoH in Firefox, unless you override)
- ❖ A second non-CloudFlare DoH option is NextDNS.io

# Web Browsers Pushing DoH

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- ❖ Chrome supports DoH, not enabled by default - yet!
- ❖ Chrome will have a GPO to disable DoH entirely
- ❖ Microsoft chromium Edge browser supports
- ❖ Opera supports, not enabled by default

# DoC = Surveillance

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- ❖ Not all of the cloud providers have clear privacy policies.
- ❖ Data retention can be 24 hours to 2 years, if spelled out at all.
- ❖ Aggregate data trends kept for long time
- ❖ However...



**Richard Bejtlich** ✓

@taosecurity

Replying to [@dangoodin001](#)

DoH is an unfortunate answer to a complicated problem. I personally prefer DoT (DNS over TLS). Putting an OS-level function like name resolution in the hands of an application via DoH is a bad idea. See what [@paulvixie](#) has been writing for the most informed commentary.

7:16 PM · Sep 10, 2019 · [TweetDeck](#)



**Nick Sullivan**  @grittygrease · Oct 20, 2018

DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH) is now RFC 8484. This is a big step forward for DNS security. [rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8484.txt](https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8484.txt)

 15

 356

 692



**Paul Vixie**  
@paulvixie

Replying to [@grittygrease](#)

Rfc 8484 is a cluster duck for internet security. Sorry to rain on your parade. The inmates have taken over the asylum.

5:49 PM · Oct 20, 2018 · [Twitter Web App](#)

**25** Retweets **73** Likes





**Bert Hubert** 

@PowerDNS\_Bert

Replying to [@bortzmeyer](#) and [@FernandoGont](#)

DoH encrypts precisely zero data that is not already present in unencrypted form. As it stands, using DoH only provides *\*additional\** leaks of data. SNI, IP addresses, OCSP and remaining HTTP connections still provide the rest. It is fake privacy in 2019.

8:10 AM · Sep 22, 2019 · [Twitter Web App](#)

**11** Retweets   **26** Likes



**da\_667.jpg.ps1**

@da\_667



-DoH is terrible, does nothing you think it actually does, and is essentially repeating the same mistakes we collectively made from the PRISM program: consolidating trust with confidential data to organizations that very clearly don't deserve it.

8:26 PM · Jan 2, 2020 · [TweetDeck](#)

**15** Retweets   **32** Likes



**Tony Finch** @fanf · Sep 8, 2018

[youbroketheinternet.org/trackedanyway](https://youbroketheinternet.org/trackedanyway) - TLS session resumption allows Google and Facebook to track you without cookies.



- ❖ TLS Session Resumption Tickets
- ❖ A nearly unblockable “cookie” that can be used to track you everywhere when resuming previous TLS sessions (all HTTPS apps including DoH) over a long period of time (up to 7 days with TLS 1.3)

# DoC = Surveillance

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- ❖ All these providers and cloud services are USA based and subject to National Security Letters, FISA 702, and other ways
- ❖ logs with detailed information about your Internet sessions can be grabbed by governments and law enforcement without disclosure

# Recommendations

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- ❖ Run your own internal recursive DNS server - best performance by far!
- ❖ If using MS AD in your corporate environment, you are already doing this, but probably poorly
- ❖ Your logging/monitoring goes here

# Recommendations

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- ❖ On your firewall
  - ❖ Block all outbound TCP/UDP Port 53 for all endpoints for regular DNS
  - ❖ Force endpoints to use internal DNS
  - ❖ Block TCP 853 to block DoT

# Recommendations

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- ❖ On your corporate firewall
  - ❖ If you have HTTPS/TLS/SSL interception and inspection via a MITM proxy on your firewall, you can likely enable rules to block DoH depending on your vendor.

# Recommendations

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- ❖ Set your endpoint configuration standards to disable DoH in browsers
- ❖ Point endpoint DNS servers to internal recursive only (via DHCP, GPO, static configs, regkeys, etc.)



# Recommendations

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- ❖ Configure your internal recursive servers to talk to the outside world only via a known set of resolvers using DoH, DoT or dnscrypt.
- ❖ Will prevent ISP & easy gov data collection
- ❖ use a server with enough traffic to get “privacy mixer” herd protection for queries
  - located in a GDPR country

# Recommendations

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- ❖ Consider internal network IP capture of all of the well known public DNS resolvers in addition to universal block at the edge
- ❖ Many IoT devices use hardcoded DNS
- ❖ Many, many ISPs and hotel networks do this already now — you don't always talk to the actual server you think you are

# Recommendations


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- ❖ You can use DNS to block advertising and known fraudulent websites with malware.
- ❖ Malware blocking - Cisco Umbrella, Quad9, Canadian SHIELD

# Recommendations

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- ❖ Run Pi-Hole to block most advertising locally, can chain to external resolving servers
- ❖ <https://pi-hole.net>
- ❖ Linux based, or run a container



**IT'S ALWAYS DNS**



**ALWAYS**

memegenerator.net

# Thank you!

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- ❖ **This slide deck will be available to download on the MTUG website.**
- ❖ **[jamesltroutman@gmail.com](mailto:jamesltroutman@gmail.com)**
- ❖ **Twitter: [@troutman](https://twitter.com/troutman)**

# Selected Bibliography & Resources

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- \* [https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public\\_recursive\\_name\\_server](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_recursive_name_server)
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- \* <https://www.zdnet.com/article/dns-over-https-causes-more-problems-than-it-solves-experts-say/>



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- ❖ <https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/canary-domain-use-application-dnsnet>
- ❖ <https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/DOH-resolver-policy>
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- ❖ <https://www.chromium.org/developers/dns-over-https>

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- \* <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/05/15/microsoft-joins-encrypted-dns-club-with-windows-10-option/>
- \* <https://www.ericconrad.com/2020/03/threat-hunting-via-dns.html>
- \* <https://blog.filippo.io/we-need-to-talk-about-session-tickets/>
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- ❖ [pi-dns.com](https://pi-dns.com)
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